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HEALTH LAW
I. BLOOD SUPPLIERS' LIABILITY FOR AIDS CONTAMINATED BLOOD
In less than a decade, the medical phenomenon of acquired im-
mune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)" has developed from an obscure dis-
ease into a national epidemic. 2 As with most developing crises, AIDS
has raised unique legal issues, especially in relation to hospital or blood
bank liability for supplying AIDS infected blood.3 This survey analyzes
the developing South Carolina law in the area of liability for AIDS
contaminated blood products.4
A. Background
The issue of blood bank liability for "defective" blood is not new
to the legal profession. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s blood banks
faced the prospect of liability for blood contaminated by the serum
hepatitis virus.5 With AIDS infected blood, however, blood banks face
a significantly greater risk of liability. Unlike the 5 to 10 percent fatal-
1. For background information on AIDS, see Curran & Morgan, Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome: The Beginning, the Present, and the Future, Forward to H.
COLE & G. LUNDBERG, AIDS FROM THE BEGINNING at XXI (1986); F. SIEGAL & M. SIEGAL,
AIDS: THE MEDICAL MYSTERY (1983).
2. As early as 1984, AIDS was declared the nation's number one health priority by
the United States Public Health Service. See U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, THE FEDERAL
RESPONSE TO AIDS - TWENTY-NINTH REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPER-
ATIONS TOGETHER WITH DISSENTING AND ADDITIONAL ViEws, H.R. REP. No. 582, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1983).
3. Several law review articles provide in-depth analyses of these issues. See, e.g.,
Lipton, Blood Donor Services and Liability Issues Relating to Acquired Immune Defi-
ciency Syndrome, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 131 (1986); Williams, Blood Transfusions and Aids:
A Legal Perspective, 32 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 267 (1986); Bielan, Bad Blood, 5 CALIF.
LAW. 29 (1985); Note, Hepatitis, AIDS and Blood Product Exemption from Strict Prod-
ucts Liability in California: A Reassessment, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1101 (1986); Comment,
Hospital and Blood Bank Liability to Patients who Contract AIDS Through Blood
Transfusions, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 875 (1986); Comment, Transfusion-Associated Ac-
quired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS): Blood Bank Liability?, 16 U. BALT. L.
REV. 81 (1986).
4. Blood products include platelets, plasma, and packed cells.
5. For a general discussion as well as a research guide to articles addressing this
topic, see Comment, Blood Transfusions and the Transmission of Serum Hepatitis: The
Need for Statutory Reform, 24 Am. U.L. REV. 367, 368 n.7 (1975) (listing over 45 articles
on the subject).
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ity rate of serum hepatitis, AIDS almost certainly ends in death.6 Fur-
thermore, as a result of the AIDS crisis, blood suppliers contend they
can no longer obtain insurance to cover liability for contaminated
blood.'
Additionally, the sheer number of AIDS infected blood cases
makes the potential liability overwhelming. Although most early AIDS
victims were homosexual men, at least three hemophiliacs had con-
tracted AIDS by 1982, and "[b]y late 1983 twenty-seven cases of AIDS
in hemophiliacs had been reported." 8 While the initial number of re-
ported cases seems insignificant, the Centers for Disease Control esti-
mate that by 1984, 12,000 individuals in the United States had been
exposed to AIDS from blood transfusions,9 and by 1988 at least 10 per-
cent of these had developed AIDS.10 Accordingly, this exponential
growth of the number of AIDS infected blood cases creates a dilemma
for every court facing the prospect of holding blood banks liable for
contaminated transfusions.
The policy of compensating innocent victims requires that injured
parties and their families receive compensation for the lethal disease
contracted as a direct result of the transfusion. The need for insuring
an adequate supply of blood, however, dictates that blood banks be
insulated from absolute liability. As a result, courts generally have de-
nied recovery under a no-fault theory of liability, but have allowed re-
covery under a negligence theory.
B. Theories of Liability
1. Liability Without Fault
Since the first infected blood case, Perlmutter v. Beth David Hos-
pital," plaintiffs have attempted to recover under a no-fault theory of
liability. Following Perlmutter, most courts have rejected claims of
6. See Note, Hepatitis, AIDS and Blood Product Exemption, supra note 3, at
1115-17.
7. See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 15-16 n.8, Doe v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 297
S.C. 430, 377 S.E.2d 323 (1989); Samson v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 295 S.C. 359, 368
S.E.2d 665 (1988) (Samson 1).
8. Curran & Morgan, supra note 1, at XXI-II.
9. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Centers for Disease Control, Human
Immuno Deficiency Virus Infection in Transfusion Recipients and Their Families, 36
Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Rep. 137, 139 (March 20, 1987) (based on study covering
1978-1934).
10. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Centers for Disease Control, Update:
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) - Worldwide, 37 Morbidity & Mortality
Weekly Rep. 286, 293 (May 13, 1988).
11. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
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breach of implied warranty12 and strict liability.13 In addition to this
common law tradition, almost all state legislatures have adopted
"blood shield statutes" to protect blood suppliers from no-fault liabil-
ity.14 Although no uniform blood shield statute exists, the statutes can
be roughly divided into three categories.
First, a number of states merely codified the Perlmutter case,
which held that blood is a service rather than a sale.' By defining the
provision of blood as a service, the legislatures avoid liability for
breach of implied warranty since no "sale" has occurred. Furthermore,
many courts in these jurisdictions have also concluded that the sale/
service distinction bars recovery under strict tort because, by defini-
tion, blood is not a product.' A second category of statutes explicitly
12. See Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd in part,
vacated in part on other grounds, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Sloneker v. Saint Jo-
seph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964); Whitehurst v. American Nat'l Red Cross,
1 Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d 584 (1965); Saint Luke's Hosp. v. Schmaltz, 188 Colo. 353, 534
P.2d 781 (1975) (en bane); White v. Sarasota County Pub. Hosp. Bd., 206 So. 2d 19 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 211 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1968); Parr v. Palmyra Park Hosp.,
Inc., 139 Ga. App. 457, 228 S.E.2d 596 (1976); Lovett v. Emory Univ., Inc., 116 Ga. App.
277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967); Warvel v. Michigan Community Blood Center, 74 Mich. App.
440, 253 N.W.2d 791 (1977); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank,
Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Moore v. Underwood Memorial Hosp., 147
N.J. Super. 252, 371 A.2d 105 (App. Div. 1977); Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 127 N.J. Super.
331, 317 A.2d 392 (App. Div. 1974), aff'd, 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975); Goelz v. J.K.
& Susie L. Wadley Research Inst. & Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961);
Dibblee v. Dr. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085
(1961); Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956); Foster
v. Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 159 W. Va. 147, 219 S.E.2d 916 (1975); Koenig v. Milwaukee
Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964).
13. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Baptist Memorial Hasp., 469 F.2d 230, 232-34 (6th Cir.
1972) (applying Tennessee law); Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1058-61; Moore, 147 N.J. Super.
at 255-56, 371 A.2d at 107-08; Brody, 127 N.J. Super. at 339-40, 317 A.2d at 396-98;
Hines v. Saint Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 764-65, 527 P.2d 1075, 1076-77, cert. denied,
87 N.M. 111, 529 P.2d 1232 (1974); Morse v. Riverside Hosp., 44 Ohio App. 2d 422, 427,
339 N.E.2d 846, 850-51 (1974).
14. New Jersey and Vermont are the only two states that have not adopted some
form of blood shield statute. The New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled, however, that
blood suppliers cannot be liable under either strict tort or implied warranty. See Brody,
127 N.J. Super. at 331, 317 A.2d at 392. The Vermont Supreme Court has not considered
the issue. The District of Columbia has also rejected no-fault liability for blood suppliers.
See Kozup, 663 F. Supp. 1048.
15. See ALA. CODE § 7-2-314 (1984); ARiz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 36-1151 (1986) (limited
to hepatitis); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1979); FLA. STAT. § 672-316(5)
(1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 139.125 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 2-108 (Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.928 (West 1975); MISS. CODE ANN. §
41-41-1 (Supp. 1988); NEB. REV. STAT. § 460.010 (1986); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 580(4)
(McKinney Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-31-1 (1989).
16. See, e.g., McKee v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Ky. 1987),
aff'd sub nom. McKee v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 866 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1989); Cramer
1989]
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precludes liability for breach of implied warranty, but does not men-
tion strict liability.17 Nevertheless, courts have extended such statutes
to preclude strict liability in tort as well.' 8 The third category of stat-
utes, to which the majority of states subscribe, declares that "no strict
liability in tort, nor any implied warranty, attaches to the . .. dis-
tributi[on] [of blood] ...."I"
The South Carolina blood shield statute fits into the second cate-
gory, since the statute expressly exempts liability only for breach of
warranty. The statute, South Carolina Code section 44-43-10, reads:
The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not
be applicable to a contract for the sale, procurement, processing, dis-
tribution or use of human tissues such as corneas, bones or organs,
whole blood, plasma, blood products or blood derivatives. Such
human tissues, whole blood, plasma, blood products or blood deriva-
tives shall not be considered commodities subject to sale or barter and
the transplanting, injection, transfusion or other transfer of such sub-
stances into the human body shall be considered a medical service.'0
v. Queen of Angels Hosp., 62 Cal. App. 3d 812, 133 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1976).
17. ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.316(3)(e) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-280 (West
1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-316(5) (1974); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-2-316(5), 51-1-28
(1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-91 (1988) (liability precluded only "as long as there is no
known scientific test to detect the virus of serum hepatitis"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
106, § 2-316(5) (West Supp. 1989); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.9121(3) (Supp. 1989);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431-069 (Vernon Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-5 (Supp 1988);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.11 (Anderson 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2151 (West
1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.300 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 57A-2-315.1 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-316(5) (1979); VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-297 (1985); W. VA. CODE § 16-23-1 (1985).
18. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Methodist Hosp., 522 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1975) (interpret-
ing Tennessee blood shield statute); Shephard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., Inc., 33 Cal. App.
3d 606, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973); McAllister v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 240 Ga. 246,
240 S.E.2d 247 (1977); Saint Martin v. Doty, 493 S.W.2d 95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972). South
Carolina has followed this trend. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the applicable South Carolina statute and caselaw).
19. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-b (1983). Accord ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-9-802
(1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-104 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-2-316(5), 51-1-28
(1982); IDAHO CODE § 39-3702 (1989) (limited to nonprofit suppliers); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
111, para. 5102 (Smith Hurd 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-7-2 (West Supp. 1988); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 142A.8 (West 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3701 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 2797 (West Supp. 1989) (limited to nonprofit suppliers); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 18-402 (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-33-102 to -104 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
460.010 (Michie 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-410 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-
33(3)(d) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-17-40 (1978); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8333 (pur-
don 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-30 (Supp. 1988); TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§
77.001-.003 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.120 (Supp.
1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.31(2) (West 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 35-5-110 (1988).
20. S.C. CODS ANN. § 44-43-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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Until Samson v. Greenville Hospital System (Samson 1),21 neither the
constitutionality nor the scope of the statute had been challenged.
In Samson I Mrs. Samson received an AIDS contaminated blood
transfusion in a hospital operated by the Greenville Hospital System.
The hospital had received the blood from the Carolina-Georgia Blood
Center, a nonprofit organization, which had drawn the blood from a
volunteer. Unaware of any possible complications from the 1984 trans-
fusion, Mrs. Samson became pregnant in the summer of 1985. In Sep-
tember of that year, the blood center discovered the donor was an
AIDS carrier and, through a "look back" program, tracked the donor's
previous donations and notified the hospital. The hospital contacted
Mrs. Samson and, after testing, concluded she had been exposed to the
AIDS virus. In March 1986 Mrs. Samson gave birth to a son who sub-
sequently developed AIDS; experts predict Mrs. Samson also will de-
velop AIDS in the future.
22
Consequently, Mrs. Samson, her husband, and her son sued the
hospital and the blood center in the Federal District Court of South
Carolina, asserting four causes of action: strict liability; breach of an
implied warranty of merchantability; breach of warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose; and negligence.23 The defendants moved for sum-
mary judgment on the warranty claims, asserting the South Carolina
blood shield statute precludes such claims. In response, the Samsons
argued the statute violated the equal protection clause of the South
Carolina Constitution by discriminating against victims of transfusion-
related diseases as distinguished from victims of defective products.2 4
Since the statute had never been challenged, the district court certified
the question to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
In analyzing the equal protection claim, the supreme court relied
on the established principle that a "classification will be sustained if it
is not plainly arbitrary and there is 'any reasonable hypothesis' to sup-
port it."25 Accordingly, the court's inquiry focused on whether the clas-
sification was reasonably related to the legislative purpose. The court
concluded that the purpose of the statute was to encourage a readily
available supply of blood and blood products 26 and that the classifica-
tion furthered that goal.
27
The court rejected the Samsons' claim that the statute irrationally
21. 295 S.C. 359, 368 S.E.2d 665 (1988).
22. Id. at 361-62, 368 S.E.2d at 666.
23. See Brief of Plaintiffs at 1.
24. Samson I, 295 S.C. at 366, 368 S.E.2d at 668.
25. Id. at 363, 368 S.E.2d at 667 (quoting Smith v. Smith, 291 S.C. 420, 424, 354
S.E.2d 36, 39 (1987)).
26. Id. at 364, 368 S.E.2d at 668.
27. Id. at 365, 368 S.E.2d at 668.
1989]
5
et al.: Health Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1989
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
discriminated against class members. The court stated:
[W]e find nothing irrational in the legislature's decision to distinguish
between individuals injured as a result of blood transfusions and indi-
viduals injured by improperly designed or manufactured man-made
goods. Equally rational was the creation of a class of distributors ex-
empt from implied warranties. We agree with the many courts and
legislatures which recognize that blood and its derivatives are ren-
dered unique and medically vital by man's inability to produce a syn-
thetic substitute.
2 8
Thus, the court concluded the blood shield statute was constitutional.29
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the warranty claims, since the statute specifically pre-
cludes liability for breach of warranty.30 The defendants also moved
for summary judgment on the strict liability cause of action, claiming
that since the statute defined the supplying of blood as a service rather
than a sale, the statute also precluded liability for strict tort.31 Once
again facing a novel issue of state law, the district court certified the
question to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
This second certified question led to Samson 11,32 in which the
supreme court determined that in light of the South Carolina blood
shield statute, "blood is not a product for the purposes of strict liabil-
ity in tort."33 The court reasoned that the legislature clearly intended
28. Id. at 366, 368 S.E.2d at 668-69.
29. Id. at 368, 368 S.E.2d at 669. The court's equal protection ruling is consistent
with decisions in other states. In fact, "of the 48 blood shield statutes enacted nation-
wide, not one has been ruled unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds." Id. at 363,
368 S.E.2d at 667. See, e.g., Heirs of Fruge v. Blood Servs., 506 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1975);
McDaniel v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 469 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1972); Hyland Therapeutics
v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 509, 220 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1985); MacDonald v. Sacra-
mento Medical Found. Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App. 3d 866, 133 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1976);
Cramer v. Queen of Angels Hosp., 62 Cal. App. 3d 812, 133 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1976); Hill v.
Jackson Park Hosp., 39 Iil. App. 3d 223, 349 N.E.2d 541 (1976); Bingham v. Lutheran
Gen. & Deconess Hosps. 34 Ill. App. 3d 562, 340 N.E.2d 220 (1975).
Courts also have rejected consistently other constitutional challenges to blood shield
statutes. See, e.g., Heirs of Fruge, 506 F.2d at 848 (statute not violative of due process or
prohibition against exclusive rights or immunities); McAllister v. American Nat'l Red
Cross, 240 Ga. 246, 249, 240 S.E.2d 247, 250 (1977) (reasoning of statute free from arbi-
trariness which would render exemption of blood suppliers violative of Georgia Constitu-
tion); Glass v. Ingalls Memorial Hosp., 32 Ill. App. 3d 237, 241, 336 N.E.2d 495, 499
(1975) (legislation not violative of constitutional prohibition against special legislation).
30. See Brief of Plaintiffs at 2, Samson v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 297 S.C. 409, 377
S.E.2d 311 (1989) (Samson II).
31. Id. (plaintiffs relying on Deloach v. Whitney, 275 S.C. 543, 273 S.E.2d 768
(1981) (strict liability statute applies only to products and not to services)).
32. Samson II, 297 S.C. 409, 377 S.E.2d 311.
33. Id. at 411, 377 S.E.2d at 312.
[Vol. 41
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to define the provision of blood as a service rather than a product.
Therefore, since services are not subject to strict liability, the provision
of blood cannot be subject to strict liability. 4 Furthermore, the court
noted that strict liability would defeat the underlying purpose of the
act by allowing a party to circumvent the statutory bar against no-fault
liability. Finally, the court noted that the majority of other jurisdic-
tions with blood shield statutes similar to South Carolina's statute
have determined that blood was not a product subject to strict tort
liability.35 Thus, Samson I and Samson II conclusively establish that a
party will not be able to recover for infected blood under a no-fault
theory of liability.
In both Samson cases, the court's holdings were based on the ap-
parent legislative intent of the blood shield statute to avoid no-fault
liability for blood suppliers. Arguably, these decisions undercut the
policies supporting strict liability for defective products: relieving
plaintiffs of the difficult burden of proving negligence; "encouraging"
defendants to improve product safety; and equitably spreading the ec-
onomic risk involved in transfusions. 6 The legislature determined,
however, that other policy considerations justify the exemption for
blood suppliers.
Even if blood is to be considered a product, its uniqueness justifies
special treatment. Unlike many of our modern day conveniences, an
ample blood supply is essential to life. Nevertheless, present day tech-
nology cannot always detect contaminated blood,37 and, unlike penicil-
lin, it cannot be replaced with a safer synthetic substitute. Thus, to
insure an adequate blood supply and avoid crippling the industry, the
legislature has exempted blood suppliers from strict liability, especially
since all volunteer blood for transfusions comes from charitable organi-
zations.3 Although the causal link between the imposition of strict lia-
bility and the resulting "crippling liability" may be questioned, legisla-
tures have almost unanimously concluded that any attempt "to require
providers to serve as insurers of the safety of these materials might
34. Id.
35. Id. at 411 n.2, 377 S.E.2d at 312 n.2.
36. See generally Comment, Hepatitus, AIDS & Blood Products Exemption,
supra note 3, at 1124-29 (arguing that policies supporting strict liability justify holding
blood suppliers liable in strict tort). But see Comment, Hospital and Blood Bank Liabil-
ity, supra note 3, at 886-88 (concluding that policies of strict liability support exempting
blood suppliers from no-fault liability).
37. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing procedures for discov-
ering contaminated blood).
38. The American Red Cross collects 50% of this blood and hospitals and commu-
nity blood banks each collect 25%. See Brief of Appellee at 1, Doe v. American Red
Cross Blood Services, 297 S.C. 430, 377 S.E.2d 323 (1989).
1989]
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impose such an overwhelming burden as to discourage the gathering
and distribution of blood."3
2. Negligence
While courts seem willing to hold blood banks liable for negli-
gently supplying AIDS contaminated blood, plaintiffs rarely will suc-
ceed in asserting such claims.40 First, to be liable for negligence, a
blood supplier must have acted unreasonably in light of risks about
which he knew or should have known.41 Accordingly, since there were
no confirmed cases of individuals developing AIDS from transfusions
until 1983,42 there can be no liability for pre-1983 transfusions contam-
inated with AIDS.
43
Proving negligence for post-1983 transfusions also will be difficult,
because most courts only hold blood banks to a "professional" rather
than a "reasonable man" standard of care." In Doe v. American Red
Cross Blood Services45 the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted this
rule by holding that a blood supplier will be liable for negligence only
if it fails to follow the generally recognized practices in the
profession.'0
In Doe the plaintiff received a unit of AIDS contaminated blood
during surgery at Lexington County Hospital on January 9, 1985. The
blood had been collected by the Red Cross on the fourth of January,
39. Zichichi v. Middlesex Memorial Hosp., 204 Conn. 399, 409, 528 A.2d 805, 810
(1987); see also Heirs of Fruge v. Blood Servs., 506 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1975) (underlying
public policy to protect blood); McAllister v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 240 Ga. 246, 240
S.E.2d 247 (1977) (purpose of Georgia's blood shield statute is to protect the state's frag-
ile blood supply); Hill v. Jackson Park Hosp., 39 IM. App. 3d 223, 349 N.E.2d 541 (1976)
(Illinois legislature exempted blood suppliers from absolute liability because of the
unique and indispensable nature of blood); Garvey v. Saint Elizabeth Hosp., 103 Wash.
2d 756, 697 P.2d 248 (1985) (en banc) (purpose of Washington's blood shield statute is to
exempt blood suppliers from no-fault liability).
40. See, e.g., Jones v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Ga. 1988)
(on JNOV, judge reversed $1.6 million dollar jury award to hemophiliac).
41. See Lipton, supra note 3, at 144.
42. For a comprehensive discussion of the exact time the first AIDS transfusion
cases were reported and confirmed, see id. at 140-44.
43. See Jones, 700 F. Supp. at 1130 (plasma center could not be negligent for fail-
ure to screen donors before 1983 when medical community discovered AIDS in blood
transfusions and FDA released proposed screening recommendations).
44. E.g., Sawyer v. Methodist Hosp., 522 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1975); Kozup v. Ge-
orgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other
grounds, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Tufaro v. Methodist Hosp., Inc., 368 So. 2d 1219
(La. Ct. App. 1979); Hutchins v. Blood Servs., 161 Mont. 359, 506 P.2d 449 (1973).
45. 297 S.C. 430, 377 S.E.2d 323 (1989).
46. Id. at 436, 377 S.E.2d at 326.
[Vol. 41
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three months before the HIV antibody test to screen blood for the
AIDS virus was developed.41 Several surrogate tests8 were available,
but were not used by the Red Cross. Doe sued the Red Cross for negli-
gence, alleging that it acted unreasonably in not using the substitute
tests. Even though the blood bank profession had rejected the use of
surrogate tests, Doe argued that industry custom did not establish the
standard of care, especially since the Red Cross, as the dominant sup-
plier, dictated the custom of the industry."
The supreme court rejected Doe's arguments, holding that blood
suppliers only had to conform to the custom of the profession in order
to avoid liability. Although the court admitted there were no explicit
precedents for applying a professional standard of care, it discussed
several cases that implicitly applied a professional standard. 0 The
court then fashioned a test for professional negligence cases: "the
plaintiff must prove. . that the professional failed to conform to the
generally recognized and accepted practices in his profession. If the
plaintiff is unable to demonstrate [this failure], then the professional
cannot be found liable as a matter of law."51 The court then applied
the standard to the Red Cross. Relying on its ruling in Samson I, that
the blood shield statute reflected a legislative intent to characterize the
transfusion of blood as a medical service, the court held that "the Red
Cross, as a blood collector and processor, should be treated as a
47. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (discussion of test and
development).
48. A surrogate test tries to identify characteristics in blood which often accom-
pany the AIDS virus. Accordingly, even though the target condition (in this case AIDS)
cannot be directly identified, the presence of bther serological or metabolic products
tends to prove that the "target condition" is nevertheless present. For example, since the
hepatitis B core antibody was often present in AIDS contaminated blood, some research-
ers attempted to screen blood with the hepatitis B core antibody test to avoid the AIDS
virus. These surrogate tests, however, never have been implemented by the blood indus-
try, because results of the screening were far from conclusive: blood may be contami-
nated with the AIDS virus yet not contain the hepatitus antibody; or, blood may contain
the hepatitis antibody yet not be contaminated with the AIDS virus. See generally, Lip-
ton, supra note 3, at 147-48 (explaining the various surrogate tests and the reasons the
Red Cross chose not to implement them).
49. See Brief of Plaintiff at 10, Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 297 S.C.
430, 377 S.E.2d 323 (1989). Doe's argument was primarily based on the principle laid
down by Judge Hand in T.J. Hooper that the custom of the industry cannot set the
standard of care because the whole industry "may have unduly lagged in the adoption of
new and available devices." The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Eastern Transp. Co. v. Northern Barge Corp., 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
50. See, e.g., Cox v. Lund, 286 S.C. 410, 334 S.E.2d 116 (1985) (physician); King v.
Williams, 276 S.C. 478, 279 S.E.2d 618 (1981) (physician); Kemmerlin v. Wingate, 274
S.C. 62, 261 S.E.2d 50 (1979) (accountant).
51. Doe, 297 S.C. at 435, 377 S.E.2d at 326.
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professional. '52
In Doe the supreme court faced a troubling issue. Unlike the un-
regulated shipping industry in The T.J. Hooper,63 blood suppliers set
strict safety standards and "adhere rigidly to the regulatory procedures
in order to protect the integrity of their business and their licensure
status."54 In fact, the FDA explicitly approves standards set by the
American Association of Blood Banks and the American Red Cross in
its "good manufacturing practices" recommendations. 5 On the other
hand, the FDA is subject to regulatory capture, and the Red Cross,
whose reasonableness is not subject to jury review, is setting its own
standard of care. Nevertheless, the court determined that the blood
profession's standards reflect the composite judgment of a highly regu-
lated and complex industry and guarantee, to the greatest extent possi-
ble, a safe blood supply.
Furthermore, the supreme court recognized that resolving compli-
cated issues on the standard of care in a technical profession is beyond
the purview of an ordinary lay juror and should be left to the "collec-
tive wisdom of a profession."' 5 This rationale clearly applies to con-
taminated blood cases. Faced with the sympathetic facts that most
AIDS transfusion cases present, few juries would hesitate to award
damages, even if the blood bank had done everything possible to insure
pure blood.5
Although the professional standard established in Doe places a
greater burden on plaintiffs, parties who prove a blood bank has failed
to follow industry custom will be able to recover for damages resulting
from infected blood. Generally, the blood supplier will commit one of
two errors: failure to screen donors adequately or failure to test ade-
quately the blood itself.
As soon as the link between AIDS and blood transfusions was es-
tablished in 1983, blood banks adopted procedures for screening high
risk donors.55 Accordingly, a blood bank may be negligent if it fails to
follow one or more of the following accepted procedures: educating
52. Id. at 436, 377 S.E.2d at 326.
53. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Eastern Transp. Co. v. Northern
Barge Corp., 237 U.S. 662 (1932), see supra note 49.
54. Comment, Transfusion-Associated AIDS, supra note 3, at 98.
55. See 21 C.F.R. § 606.100(d)(1)-(2)(1988).
56. Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 297 S.C. 430, 435, 377 S.E.2d 323, 326
(1989).
57. See, e.g., Jones v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Ga. 1988)
(JNOV on basis that jury relied more on emotions than facts of the case).
58. See Lipton, supra note 3, at 144-45. But see generally R. SHILTS, AND THE
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possible AIDS carriers of the dangers of donating blood;59 questioning
donors on diseases, symptoms of the AIDS virus, or even on sexual
practices;60 providing a call-back mechanism whereby a donor who sus-
pects he may have AIDS can anonymously have his blood removed
from the pool; avoiding high risk AIDS areas when choosing donation
centers; refusing to accept blood from donors who have tested positive
for AIDS in the past and disposing of any blood previously given by
these donors; educating blood bank personnel to recognize symptoms
of AIDS which would place a donor in a high risk category,1
A blood bank also may be liable for failing to test blood collected
after 1985.62 By late 1984 scientists finally had identified the source of
the AIDS virus as HTLV III/LAV (HIV) virus and were able to de-
velop a test to detect HIV antibodies in blood. The test was licensed
by the FDA in March of 1985.3 Although the test cannot actually de-
tect the AIDS virus, it has been accepted and implemented by the
blood profession.64 Consequently, if a supplier fails to test blood col-
lected after 1985 for HIV antibodies, the supplier probably will be lia-
ble for negligence.
59. See Lipton, supra note 3, at 146. In March of 1983, the FDA listed donor edu-
cation as one of the most important screening procedures, since any effective screening
procedure depended upon the cooperation of the infected donors. Id.
60. In the hepatitis context, courts have held blood suppliers liable for failing to
question a donor. See, e.g., Morse v. Riverside Hosp., 44 Ohio App. 2d 422, 339 N.E.2d
846 (1974); Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). Subsequent studies
by the Red Cross, however, indicate that questioning will rarely identify an AIDS carrier,
since "high-risk donors who refuse to refrain from donating blood after being requested
to do so can also be expected to provide untruthful answers to 'direct' questions about
sexual practices. . . ... Lipton, supra note 3, at 147. See also Jones 700 F. Supp. at 1132
(homosexual lied to plasma center more than 25 times when asked about sexual
practices).
61. See generally COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION BLOOD
BANKS, STANDARDS FOR BLOOD BANKS AND TRANSFUSION SERVICES (12th ed. 1987) (dis-
cussing the various screening procedures available to blood banks).
62. Before 1985 a few blood banks experimented with surrogate tests in high risk
areas such as San Francisco. After the studies were completed, however, the Red Cross
decided not to implement the surrogate tests. See Lipton, supra note 3, at 148 (listing
the five reasons on which the Red Cross based its decision). Therefore, following the
standard of the profession, a blood bank should not be held liable for falling to test
blood until the HIV antibody test was developed in 1985 and adopted by the blood pro-
fession. This is essentially the conclusion of the court in Doe, since Red Cross's motion
for summary judgment was based on the fact that the practice among blood banks in
January of 1985 was not to use surrogate tests. See Doe v. American Red Cross Blood
Servs., 297 S.C. 430, 433-35, 377 S.E.2d 323, 325-26 (1989).
63. See 50 Fed. Reg. 9909 (1985).
64. See Lipton, supra note 3, at 151 ("All evidence, thus, suggests that, nationwide,
the tests were implemented as soon as they became available.").
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C. Conclusion
In the Samson and Doe cases the South Carolina Supreme Court
delineated the applicability and scope of the blood shield statute in
cases against a blood supplier for defective blood: a party cannot re-
cover for breach of implied warranty or strict tort, and can only re-
cover in negligence when the blood supplier has failed to comply with
the custom of the profession.
Furthermore, even though the defendants in the cases were non-
profit organizations, the supreme court probably would apply the same
standard to commercial blood derivative manufacturers and suppliers.
In Samson I the supreme court rejected the plaintiff's argument that
the blood shield statute discriminated against commercial blood sup-
pliers by noting that "the statute does not distinguish paid donors
from voluntary donors or commercial distributors from charitable dis-
tributors." 5 Moreover, courts construing statutes similar to South Car-
olina's have held that they apply with equal force to commercial blood
suppliers.6" Commercial suppliers, then, should have to meet the stan-
dard of care established for nonprofit suppliers.6 7 Accordingly, the
Samson and Doe cases have laid the framework for future "defective"
blood cases, giving the bar a solid basis on which to evaluate and pre-
dict such claims.
James K. Lehman
65. Samson v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 295 S.C. 359, 366, 368 S.E.2d 665, 669 (1988).
66. See, e.g., Coffee v. Cutter Biological, 809 F.2d 191, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1987) (con-
struing Connecticut's blood shield statute, which is identical to South Carolina's); Mc-
Kee v. Miles Laboratories Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Ky. 1987) (construing Ken-
tucky's blood shield statute), aff'd sub nom. McKee v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 866
F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1989); Hyland Therapeutics v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 509,
516, 220 Cal. Rptr. 590, 594 (1985) ("production and use of blood and its derivatives for
therapeutic purposes should be encouraged and, thus, providers of such products who
are themselves free from fault should not bear the economic loss that rules of strict
liability might impose"). But see Comment, Strict Liability for Blood Derivative Manu-
facturers: Statutory Shield Incompatible with Public Health Responsibility, 28 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 443 (1984) (arguing that policy considerations supporting limited liability
for hospitals and blood banks do not support the extension of such protection to the
blood derivative product manufacturing industry).
67. Even if commercial suppliers are not held to a higher standard of care, their
potential liability is still much greater than nonprofit blood banks. Under South Carolina
Code section 33-55-210, a plaintiff cannot collect a tort judgment greater than $200,000
from a charitable organization such as a blood bank, whereas a commercial blood bank
faces unlimited liability. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-55-210 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp.
1988). See also Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 297 S.C. 430, 438-39, 377
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